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We consider an exchange market for an indivisible, heterogeneous good where pairs of buyers 
and sellers bargain over prices in different transactions. A stable outcome in one negotiation 
cannot be uniquely determined by the outcome of other negotiations, but the result of those 
transactions has influence through endogenously determined outside options. We prove existence 
of equilibria with the property that no agent wished to rebargain. These bargaining equilibria 
form a subset of the set of Walrasian equilibria. In a replicated market all Walrasian eauilibria 
are already stable under rebargaining. A bargaining process is shown to converge to the set of 
equilibria. 
1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to study the process of negotiation and 
price formation in two-sided markets where the traded objects are hetero- 
geneous and indivisible. Quoting from Shapely and Shubik (1971): ‘Two- 
sided market models are important as Cournot, Edgeworth, Bohm-Bawerk, 
and others have observed, not only for the insights they may give into more 
general economic situations with many types of traders, but also for the 
simple reason that in real life many markets and most actual transactions are 
in fact bilateral - i.e., bring together a buyer and a seller of a single 
commodity’. 
We consider here a market for a good which is available in indivisible 
units. The units of this good may differ in quality. There are two a-priori 
determined distinct groups: buyers and sellers. All agents may possess a 
perfectly divisible good called ‘money’, and each seller has also one unit of 
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the indivisible good. Each agent has preferences on the possible combi- 
nations of money (which represents here the consumption of all ‘other’ 
goods) and units of the indivisible good. We assume that no agent wishes to 
own more than one unit of the indivisible good. 
Shapley and Shubik (1971) studied such a market modeled as a game with 
transferable utility. Kaneko (1982) generalized their results to games without 
the transferable utility assumption. The main results are that the core of such 
a market is not empty, and that the set of competitive allocations coincides 
with the set of allocations in the core. For an excellent survey of two-sided 
markets see Roth and Sotomayor (1990). 
We will use here Kaneko’s model and our study begins with the following 
observation: Assume that a buyer and a seller contemplate a transaction, 
while regarding as fixed the prices paid for the units of the indivisible good 
in other transactions. The seller has then a minimum price for which he is 
willing to sell in the existing conditions. At lower prices he would find other 
buyers willing to pay more for his unit. Similarly, the buyer has a maximal 
price which she is prepared to pay for that unit given the existing conditions. 
If the price is higher, the buyer would prefer to buy other units, and she can 
afford it. The transaction can be mutually profitable if and only if the agreed 
price falls between these extremes, and, moreover, one can show that a 
certain system of transactions leads to a competitive allocation if and only if, 
for each pair in the system, the agreed price has the above described 
property. Note that the ‘reservation prices’ are not primitives of the model, 
but are endogenously arising at each specification of prices. 
For a given pair, the environment (i.e. the prices in all other transactions) 
cannot uniquely determine the price in their deal. There is a whole range of 
agreements which could lead to a competitive allocation when combined 
with fixed outside prices. We are faced with the natural question of how, in 
each transaction, exactly one price is chosen by the matched agents? Any 
short examination of markets where few agents trade relatively valuable 
goods would reveal that the process of price formation involves some 
element of bargaining. The results of other negotiations can determine, and 
this is very important, the outside options available to the various agents. 
We assume here a rather myopic and optimistic way of calculating outside 
options: the agents do not foresee the whole evolution of the market after 
possible breakdowns in present negotiations. They make only a rough 
assessment of their bargaining power at one point in time. We only require 
that the negotiated outcome depends on the outside options, and this 
dependence follows our intuition - an improvement in the terms of trade for 
one agent (due to price changes in other transactions) should not disadvan- 
tage this agent in his present negotiation. 
By inter-relating the prices in different transactions through the influence 
of outside options the following problem arises: Negotiations in transaction 
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A determines the terms of trade in transaction B. Further, the resulting price 
in transaction B may change the terms of trade in A and at least one of the 
sides may have incentives to renegotiate. Renegotiation in A matters for B 
and so on . . . The equilibrium concept must take care of this situation in a 
consistent manner. 
The previous consideration suggests a sequential dynamic process of price 
formation between matched partners, and indeed we will present such a 
process which converges to equilibrium for some initial conditions. At 
equilibrium, the agents have no incentive to renegotiate (given the existing 
bargaining procedures). 
This approach to exchange, negotiation, and the combination of the two 
suggests that the model is more suitable for situations where there is no one- 
shot exchange, but longer run relationships. Price contracts hold for a period 
of time and they may be renegotiated if the environment changed. Good 
examples would be the house-rental market, or the labor market for a given 
profession. Consider, for example, the following quotation from The 
Economist, August 11, 1990: ‘(Rock) Stars usually stick to their record labels 
but use outside offers to renegotiate better deals’. 
For a correct application of our specific model to a labor market one 
needs to assume that employees care only about their pay and not about the 
identity of their employers, but more general models where the results hold 
can be easily analyzed. 
The ‘stability under renegotiation’ idea used here goes back to Harsanyi. 
We quote from Harsanyi (1977, p. 196): A particular payoff vector ‘will 
represent the equilibrium outcome of a bargaining among the n-players only 
if no pair of players has any incentive to redistribute their payoffs between 
them, as long as the other players’ payoffs are kept constant’. This idea has 
been exactly formulated in a game theoretical framework by Davis and 
Maschler (1965) in their work on the kernel of a cooperative game. The 
work of Davis and Maschler has been elegantly used by Rochford (1984) in 
the framework of the assignment games with transferable utility due to 
Shapley and Shubik (1971). Abstact generalizations of Rochford’s work can 
be found in Roth and Sotomayor (1988), and Moldovanu (1990). 
Modeling the market situation as a game with transferable utility implies 
that the utility functions of the agents are separable, additive and linear in a 
commodity called ‘money’. While this may be a reasonable modeling 
assumption in some cases, it has considerable drawbacks in a model where 
the value of the traded objects are high relative to income. The above 
mentioned utility functions do not allow for any income effect! We obtain 
several different pairings of buyers and sellers which are compatible with 
Walrasian prices, while with transferable utility there is generically one such 
pairing. Moreover, the set of utility vectors corresponding to competitive 
allocations for a given pairing may well be non-connected, as opposed to a 
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convex set for transferable utility. This creates an additional difficulty when 
using topological fixed point arguments. For details see Moldovanu (1990). 
Finally, we wish to mention the recent approach to bargaining in markets 
which uses explicit strategic models embedded in various market models. An 
excellent book on the subject is Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). While 
different in emphasis and treatment, the basic idea of a market as a network 
of interconnected bargainers is common to this literature and to our work. 
This holds also for the important role of outside options (although the 
calculation of these options differs), and for the comparison with the 
benchmark - the Walrasian equilibrium. 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the exchange 
model and the competitive equilibria. In section 3 we describe the bargaining 
model, define the outside options of the agents, and relate the structure of 
the set of competitive equilibria with the bargaining range in bilateral 
transactions. The main results are gathered in section 4: We prove the 
existence of bargaining equilibria and compare this set with the set of 
competitive equilibria in usual and replicated markets. We also describe a 
dynamic process of bargaining which may converge to an equilibrium. In 
section 5 we discuss the results and some possible extensions. The proofs are 
gathered in section 6. 
2. The exchange model 
We consider a market for an indivisible good. The units of this good can 
be different in quality. We will call these items ‘houses’. 
There are two distinct groups of agents (or players), B= {b,,. . . ,b,} and 
s={s, )...) s,}. 
The members of B will be called ‘buyers’, and the members of S will be 
called ‘sellers’. 
Each player i in N = BUS owns an amount of money Wi. Money is 
perfectly divisible and should be interpreted as a composite good. 
Each seller owns, in addition to money, one unit of the indivisible good. 
The house of seller si will be denoted by hi. 
Thus, the initial endowment of seller si is esi =(wsi,hi) and the initial 
endowment of buyer bj is ebj =(wqj, d), where owning d represents the 
situation of owning no house (or owning a ‘dummy’ house). 
Let H={&/~~...h,,h,+~}, where i~,+~=d. 
Each agent i has a utility function 
ui : lx! x H+R. 
We make the following assumptions on the utility functions Ui: 
(2.1) 
Vie N, Ui is continuous and strictly increasing with 
respect to money. (2.2) 
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VieN, VhEH, Ui(m,h)hUi(m,d). (2.3) 
Vie N, Vhg H, U,(m, d) 2 Ui(O, h). (2.4) 
Vsj ES, Vh E H, U,(m, d) = U,j(m, h). (2.5) 
Condition (2.2) is clear. Condition (2.3) says that houses are desirable. 
Condition (2.4), which is slightly more unusual, has the following intuitive 
explanation [see also Kaneko (1982)]: Our model is a partial equilibrium 
model, where money plays the iole of all commodities that are not explicitly 
considered. Therefore it is normal to have money but no house (in which 
case one may rent a hotel room), but it is not normal to own a house and 
not consume any other thing! Condition (2.5) is needed to ensure that sellers 
do not want to buy another house after selling the one they initially own. 
We normalize the utility functions of the agents such that the utility of 
each agent from his initial endowment is exactly zero. The results will be 
independent of this normalization. 
The above described economy will be denoted by E = {(q, Vi) i E N}. 
Due to the special properties of our markets (two types, indivisibility, 
satiation) one can consider w.1.o.g. only those allocations which are derived 
from exchanges which take place in coalitions of size no larger than two (one 
buyer and one seller). Indeed, only these coalitions will play a role when 
considering the core of the economy, and hence also for the competitive 
allocations. We now define special partitions of N which have as elements 
only mixed pairs (one buyer, one seller), and singletons: 
A partition LZ = {T,, . . . , T,} of N will be called an E-partition if it satisfies: 
Vj, lljlk, )q)52. -- (2.6) 
If (T,I=2 then TjnB#QI and TjnS#@. (2.7) 
An allocation xi is feasible for i if it is just the initial endowment of this 
individual. 
Consider a pair T= {bi,Sj} with initial endowment (wbi,d) and (wsj, hj) 
respectively. An allocation xr is feasible for this pair if it has the form 
{(mbi, hj), (m,,, d)), or the form {(mbi, d), (msj, hj)}, where 
mbi + msj 5 wbi + wsj. (2.8) 
An allocation x is feasible for the economy E if there exists an E-partition 
ZZ such that for each TE ZI, xT is feasible for 7: 
An allocation x is individually-rational (IR) if the following holds: 
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&EN, Ui(d)LUi(ei)=O. (2.9) 
A pair T= {bi,sj} can improve upon an allocation x if there exists an 
allocation yr feasible for T with U,(y’) > Ui(X’), tli~ ‘T: 
The core of the economy, C(E), is the set of all individually-rational 
allocations which cannot be improved upon. This definition of the core 
coincides for the considered economies with the usual definition of the core 
where all coalitions are allowed to block. Note that in the core of our 
exchange economy there are no side-payments in the sense that, if a buyer 
gives up a certain amount of money in order to receive a house, this amount 
goes in full to the owner of this house and not, say, to ‘bribe’ another 
potential buyer. Also, it is easy to show that if x E C(E), then the allocation of 
a singleton (i.e. a trader not paired in the respective E-partition) is exactly 
her initial endowment, and her utility is hence zero. 
A vector of prices is a vector PE KY,!’ where pi represents the price of 
house hi, for 1 s i 5 I, and p r+ r = 0, this last price being the price of a dummy 
house. 
An E-partition I7 and a vector of prices p determine in a unique way an 
allocation x = x(l7, p) as follows: 
(1) For i=TeIZ, 
xi=,. 
I’ 
(2) Let T = {bi,Sj} EIZ. Then we have 
(2.10) 
Xbi =(Wbi -_Pj, h,), and (2.11) 
XSj=(Wsj+Pj,d). 
Such an allocation will be called price-generated. 
(2.12) 
Definition 2.1. A pair (n,p) is a competitive equilibrium if the price- 
generated allocation 1= x(n, p) has the following properties: 
(1) Vb, E B if Xbi =(tibi, hi) then 
(2.13) 
vhf E H, Ubf(%i, hf) > Ubi(fibi, hj)*mb, +pf > wbi. (2.14) 
(2) Vsk ES if 2” = (@I,,, hi) then 
%, s WSr + Pk, (2.15) 
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Vh, E H, Us,(ms,, h,) > Us,(ms*, hJ*ms,, +PJ >wsI, +A- (2.16) 
The intuition behind this definition is the usual one: Conditions (2.13) and 
(2.15) are the budget constraints, and conditions (2.14) and (2.16) are the 
optimality requirements. The main results of Kaneko (1982) and Quinzii 
(1984) are: 
Theorem 2.2 (Kaneko). Let E be a two-sided exchange economy with 
indivisibilities. Then the following hold: 
(1) The core of E is not empty. 
(2) Every core allocation is price-generated by a pair (ZZ,p) which is a 
competitive equilibrium. 
(3) Every competitive equilibrium (l7,p) price-generates an allocation in the 
core of the economy E. 
Note that point (3) above holds in general for exchange models, but point 
(2) is rather special. 
3. The bargaining model 
Consider a buyer and a seller which are about to make a transaction, and 
consider the situation where the prices of all the other (i.e. not involved in 
this transaction) houses are already determined. Assume that the buyer and 
the seller agree on a certain price. If the resulting vector of prices is not 
competitive there will be at least one buyer and one seller which will have 
the opportunity to achieve a better deal for both of them by leaving their 
actual partners and trade together. (This follows from the equivalence 
between core allocations and competitive allocations - Theorem 2.2). In this 
case the situation is fundamentally unstable, but even if we accept that final 
outcomes should be Walrasian, the question is whether the price of the 
considered house is uniquely determined. Note that we do not inquire the 
question of uniqueness of competitive equilibria, but we ask whether in a 
competitive equilibrium the result of all outside transactions already deter- 
mines the result of the considered one. The answer to this question is 
negative: Usually there is a whole range of prices which could be agreed 
upon by our pair such that the resulting vector or prices is competitive. 
We must now ask how is then a price chosen by a given pair, between the 
several consistent with the stability of the market. The answer offered here is 
one that involves bargaining between the agents. The prices in the outside 
transactions play an important role because they actually determine, at a 
given moment, the outside options available to the traders. Bargaining in one 
pair affects the options of other pairs, and some agents may wish to 
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renegotiate. If this renegotiation takes place, again options changed for 
others, and so ad infinitum. We are confronted with a problem of stability 
and consistency when we observe not the isolated pair, but the entire system 
of bilateral interactions. 
We first approach the question of indeterminacy, and define the outside 
options: Let ZI be an E-partition, p a vector or prices and let T = {bi, sj} EII. 
Let x = x(ZZ, p) be the price-generated allocation. 
The outside option price qbi of buyer bi is defined as the price such that 
Ubi(wb, -qbi, hj) =max ubi(wbi -f?f, hf). 
/+.i 
(3.1) 
The outside option price for the buyer in T is the maximal price bi is 
prepared to pay for the house of sj such that, by buying this house and 
paying this price, her utility will be no less than the utility achieved by 
buying any other house at current prices. Observe that the outside option 
price of the buyer is non-negative, because h, can be a dummy house (this 
means that the buyer can decide not to buy at all), the price of dummy 
houses is always zero, and because we assumed desirability of houses [see 
(2.311. 
For a buyer bk define pr as the price such that 
(3.2) 
pf is the price which buyer bk is prepared to pay for the house of sj such 
that her utility will be no less than his current one. 
For a seller sj define py as the price such that 
uSj(wSj +pj’, d I= We,,). (3.3) 
pp is the minimum price which Sj might accept for his house. At lower 
prices this seller prefers not to sell at all, and remain with his initial 
endowment. This price is non-negative by desirability of houses. 
The outside option price @j is defined then as 
(3.4) 
The outside option price for the seller in T is the maximal price this seller 
could achieve by selling his house to other buyers, while keeping these 
buyers at their current levels of utility, provided that this is at least as large 
as the minimal acceptable price for this seller. 
For agents which are not matched in ZI we define the outside options 
prices in a similar way: because these agents are not paired we can remove 
the restriction f #j in (3.1), and the restriction k#i in (3.4). 
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The outside option prices depend, of course, on the pair (Z7,p) but we will 
suppress this for the sake of simplicity of notation. 
Given a vector of prices p=(pl, pz, . . . &+,) we write (~-~,pj) for the vector 
that is identical to p in all but the jth coordinate, which is changed to pj. We 
have the following: 
Theorem 3.1. (a) A pair (ii,p) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if the 
following conditions hold for each T = { bi, sj} E ii: 
(3.5) 
~j E [q’j, qbi]. (3.6) 
(b) Moreover, if (ii, j?) is a competitive equilibrium and T = {bi, sj} Eli, then 
(it, (p- j, pj)) remains a competitive equilibrium ij” and only ifpj E [q’j, qbi]. 
Theorem 3.1 describes exactly, for one pair, the bargaining range which is 
compatible with stability of the market. The outside option prices are then 
the extremities of this range. Note that Theorem 3.1 shows that the 
Walrasian paradigm in such a model (i.e. - with few agents) does not imply 
that agents are ‘price-takers’. Prices can be negotiated in a whole range 
without affecting the stability of the market. Theorem 3.1 is a special case of 
a more general theorem about sections of the core found in Moldovanu (1989). 
We now describe the bargaining model: Given the utility functions of the 
members in a pair, which are fixed throughout this exposition, bargaining 
should depend only on their outside option prices. Thus a bargaining 
function is a function F: [w: -FIR + where the argument is a pair of prices 
representing the outside options (first coordinate for seller, second for buyer) 
and the result is the negotiated price. We impose the following conditions 
on F: 
If p1 Sp2 then p1 ~F(P~,Pz)~P~. (3.7) 
F is continuous and monotonic non-decreasing in each 
coordinate. (3.8) 
Condition (3.7) is a condition of individual rationality. Continuity is clear, 
and monotonicity represents our intuition about outside options: If p1 (for 
the seller!) increases, then his situation improved and he should not be worse 
off than before. Similarly, if pz (for the buyer!) increases, then her situation 
changed for the worse (she is required to pay more outside) and therefore she 
should not be made better off - the result of the actual bargaining is also a 
price which is not lower than before. 
AlI the main solutions to the bargaining problem (Nash, Kalai- 
Smorodinski, etc.) satisfy conditions (3.7) and (3.8). Moreover, non- 
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cooperative bargaining models with outside options [see Shaked and Sutton 
(1984)] also yield bargaining functions with these properties. We do not 
require that all pairs use the same bargaining procedure. The procedure used 
by a pair 17; given the respective utility functions, will be denoted by F,. 
We are led to a definition of bargaining equilibrium where no agent has 
the incentive to renegotiate. 
Definition 3.2. A pair (n,p) will be called a bargaining equilibrium of the 
economy E if the resulting allocation is individually-rational, and if the 
following hold: 
VSjES, ifjspj, (3.9) 
VT = {bk, sI} E R, F@‘, qbk) =pl, (3.10) 
where 4 is the vector of outside option prices based on (n,p). 
Condition (3.9) is a stability condition: if some of the inequalities do not 
hold, then the respective sellers wish to change their status (i.e. not to sell at 
all, or to sell to another buyer). This condition, written in the language of 
outside options, is similar to the one in the definition of the core, but note 
that there are no explicit stability conditions for the buyers. The main 
novelty is condition (3.10): if agents bargain using the current outside 
options, the result is exactly the market price, so there is no incentive to 
renegotiate. Note that, by (3.7), this requirement is consistent with (3.9). 
The next lemma says that in a bargaining equilibrium no buyer pays more 
than his outside option price [i.e. a stability condition similar to (3.9) is 
already implied also for buyers]. The reasoning behind this result is that, if a 
buyer pays more than her outside option, then condition (3.9) is violated for 
the seller with which that outside option is feasible. 
Lemma 3.3. Let (ii,F) be a bargaining equilibrium, and assume that buyer bi 
buys house hj in this equilibrium (hj may be a dummy house if bi remains 
single). Then pj 5 qbi. 
4. The main results 
Theorem 4.1. Every economy E has a bargaining equilibrium. 
Theorem 4.2. Each bargaining equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium of E. 
The set of bargaining equilibria is, generically, a strict subset of the set 01 
competitive equilibria. 
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We obtain a converse to the previous theorem by regarding replicated 
markets. Let d be the m-fold replica of the economy E, where each of the 
original agents appears m times, and mz2. 
Theorem 4.3. In any replicated market d each competitive equilibrium is a 
bargaining equilibrium. 
The presence of identical agents - through the property of equal treatment 
- has the effect that in any negotiation the two outside option prices are 
equal, so there is really no scope for bargaining. This is exactly our intuition 
about truly competitive markets, where the price ‘is taken as given’ i.e. 
determined by the prices outside. It is quite interesting that one replication is 
enough for the previous result. 
Next we describe a dynamic bargaining process which converges to a 
bargaining equilibrium for some special initial conditions. This process, 
which defines an operator on the set of feasible allocations, will also be used 
to prove the existence of bargaining equilibria without reference to the 
dynamics. The main tool will be then an algebraic fixed point theorem due 
to Tarski. 
Let II be an E-partition and let p be a vector or prices for which the 
allocation x = x(ZZ, p) is individually-rational. Let T,, . , . , Tk be the matched 
pairs in ZZ, where the sellers are labeled such that Vi with 15 i 5 k, si E T (the 
houses h 1 . . . h, are those involved in actual transactions). Let now p1 be the 
vector of prices resulting after the agents of TI bargained using F,, (and 
calculated their outside options prices based on p =p”, Let p2 be the price 
vector resulting after the agents in T, bargained using F,, (and calculated 
their outside options prices based on p’). We proceed in a similar way for 
P3 , . . .pk, and we define an operator B,(p) =pk. The allocation of singletons 
remains constant (as in x) throughout this process. Denote by B:, me N, the 
usual powers of the operator B, (i.e. the procedure used to describe B, is 
repeated m times). The operator B, is not necessarily well-defined for every 
initial price vector p, but as we shall see in the proofs, it is well defined for 
all p such that (Il,p) is a competitive equilibrium. For two price vectors, p 
and p’, we write p2p’ (pgp’), if Vj~lR’+l, pjzp(i (pjsp;). We have the 
following: 
Theorem 4.4. Let (II,p) be a competitive equilibrium and let p have the 
following property: There exsists ge N such that either B:(p) 5 B:+‘(p) or 
B:(p)2 B:+‘(p). Then the sequence {B;(p)}mpN converges to a price vector p* 
and (ZT,p*) is a bargaining equilibrium. 
There are many initial price vectors with the property required for 
convergence in the previous theorem. These prices display an interesting 
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polarization of interests for the members of one side of the market. Two 
simple and well-known examples are, for a given partition for which 
competitive prices exist, the vector of competitive prices with the property 
that all buyers obtain higher utility than the one they obtain in any other 
competitive allocation feasible for that partition, and the analog vector for 
the sellers. Such vectors always exist in our model, and this fact together 
with the previous theorem can supply an independent proof of existence of 
bargaining equilibria (see Theorem 4.1). Other price vectors with the 
property required for the convergence are also maximal (minimal) in the 
sense described above, but with respect to smaller sets - connected compo- 
nents of the set of competitive prices for a given partition. 
5. Discussion 
The bargaining model we use is general, the only limitation being the 
special way in which the outside options are calculated. This mode of 
calculation should not be interpreted literally: it is meant to be just one 
possible alternative of how agents take into account the existing market 
conditions. This method requires (apart from complete information) less 
sophistication than other models where the agents are required to compute 
the whole future evolution of a market after a possible breakdown in present 
negotiations. Note that traders use here optimistic assessments, because 
several agents may have the same outside option in mind. In a sense our 
traders exhibit a kind of bounded rationality when they assess their 
bargaining power. 
The dynamic procedure exhibited to show convergence to equilibria may 
give some insights to a type of situations where contracts remain valid for a 
period of time. At the end of the period renegotiation takes place, based on 
the new environment and so on (recall the quotation about rock-stars!). 
Most strategic models, where the interaction between agents is more finely 
modeled, are based on simple exchange markets (for example, all sellers have 
the same type of object and reservation price, all buyers have the same 
reservation price). It is not entirely clear how these models perform in the 
presence of finely modeled markets [for possible ‘failures’ see Osborne and 
Rubinstein (1990, p. 130, p. 60). For a full market model combined with 
strategic bargaining see Gale (1986a, b)]. 
Agents may be uncertain about the possible profits when they write 
contracts depending on future events, and they might be also uncertain 
about the conditions outside. This is translated to uncertainty about the set 
of feasible agreements and about the outside options, respectively. The use of 
a particular bargaining method may create a divergence of interests: one 
agent may prefer to sign a contract now, the other may prefer to wait till 
uncertainty is resolved. Bargaining methods exist which ensure that all agents 
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agree to contract before the uncertainty is resolved, thus ensuring Pareto- 
optimality. For a discussion of this, see Chun and Thomson (1990). The 
methods described there satisfy the conditions imposed in our model. 
If the utility functions are separable, additive and linear in ‘money’ we can 
show that bargaining equilibria of the type analyzed here are defined, and 
exist, also for markets where one agent may be both seller and buyer of the 
indivisible good [see Shapley and Scarf (1974), Quinzii ( 1984)]. Unfortun- 
ately, results in Moldovanu (1990) imply that this may not hold for general 
utility functions. The two-sided markets are exceptional in this aspect. For 
another exceptional role played by games of pairs, in the context of the 
bargaining set, see Peleg (1963). 
6. Proofs 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let (R,p) be a competitive equilibrium, and let 
T= {bi,sj} ER. We must have pis4 **. Otherwise, by the definition of outside 
options prices [see (3.1)] buyer bi can afford to buy another house at current 
prices (or remain single) while increasing his utility. This is a contradiction to 
(n,@) being a competitive equilibrium. Similarly we must have pj 2 q”, 
otherwise seller Sj can find another buyer willing to pay 4” (or remain single) 
and this would increase his utility, again a contradiction. The last two 
inequalities prove the ‘only if parts of (a) and (b). 
For the ‘if part of (a) let (n,p) be such that conditions (3.5) and (3.6) are 
satisfied. Using Kaneko’s theorem (Theorem 2.2) it is enough to show that 
the allocation x = x(R, j?) is in the core of the economy. Because x is price 
generated and by condition (3.5) we obtain that x is individually-rational. 
Assume, on the contrary, that x is not in the core. Then, by the definition of 
the core, we must have a pair R which can improve upon x. Because x is 
price generated and individually rational it cannot be the case that R en. 
Therefore assume w.1.o.g. that R = [sj, b,J with bk # bi, where bi is the partner 
of sj in R (if sj is single in n the proof is completely analogous). Then there 
exists a price p(i such that pi >pj and Ubk(Wbr-P>, h,)> Ubk(xbk). This implies 
that pi <pi” [see (3.2)] and, by the definition of the outside option price for 
sellers (3.4), we obtain pj < q’j, which is a contradiction to condition (3.6). 
For the ‘if part of (b) let (n, j) be a competitive equilibrium and let 
T = { bi, Sj> in. Varying the price in that transaction may change the outside 
options of other agents. We have to prove that (it,(p_j,pj)) remains an 
equilibrium if pj E [qsj,qbi]. Again, it is enough to prove that the price 
generated allocation y = y(R, (p- j, pi)) is in the core. Assume, on the contrary, 
that a pair R can improve upon y. Obviously Rf T, and if R c N\T we 
obtain a contradiction to the competitiveness of (n,$. Therefore assume 
w.1.o.g. that R = (sj, b,J where b, # bi. The proof now continues exactly as at 
point (a). Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. Denote by 2 the resulting allocation in this equili- 
brium. If hj is a dummy house the result is clear because the price of dummy 
houses is zero, and the outside option prices are always non-negative [see 
remark after (3.1)]. Assume then that bi buys the house owned by sj, and the 
inequality does not hold. Then we have 
Assume that the maximum in the last term is achieved for h, # hj. Then there 
exists a>0 such that 
ubi(wbi --(@I +&), h,) = ubi(wbi -pj, hj) = Ubi(Xbi). 
Then of =pr +E [see (3.2)], and this is a contradiction because, by the 
definition of bargaining equilibria, (3.9), and by the delinition of outside 
options, (3.4), we know that p1 2 cf”’ 2 pf. Q.E.D. 
For the proof of Theorem 4.1 we will use the following elegant fixed point 
theorem due to Tarski: 
Theorem 6.1 [Tarski (1955)]. Let (L, >) be a complete lattice and let A be a 
monotonic operator on L (i.e. X> Y implies A(X)> A(Y)). Then A has a fixed 
point. 
Let n be an E-partition, and define 
P, = {p 1 (ZZ, p) is a competitive equilibrium}. (6.1) 
We define an order relation on the set P,: p’>p if and only if p’zp. 
For two vectors p, p’ define two new vectors p A p’ and p v p’, where 
(PA P’)i =mWPi,P$ (6.2) 
(6.3) 
The next three lemmata will enable the use Tarski’s Theorem in our 
framework. The first one displays a property that is well known in two-sided 
models [see Demange and Gale (1985), Roth and Sotomayor (1990)]: 
Lemma 6.2. Let P, # 0. Then (P,, >) is a complete lattice. 
Proof. We have to prove that for each p, p’ E P, also p A p’ and p v p’ belong 
to P,. We start by showing that (L!,p A p’) is indeed a competitive equili- 
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brium. Obviously the resulting allocation x is feasible and individually- 
rational. It is enough to show that XE C(E). Assume, on the contrary that 
this is not the case. Then, there is a pair T = {hi, sj} which can improve upon 
x. Assume w.1.o.g. that (p A P’)~ =pj. This yields a contradiction to (n,p) 
being a competitive equilibrium. Similarly, if (p v P’)~ = pi. In the same way 
we get the result for (p A p’). Q.E.D. 
Lemma 6.3. Let Ii’ be an E-partition such that P, # 125. Then, for each p E P,, 
the operator B, is well defined (see section 4), and B,(p) E P,. 
Proof: Let TI . . . . Tk be the ordered pairs in n, and let p1 the vector or 
prices resulting after the members of T1 have bargained. Then pi = 
FT,(qSL,qb’) where the outside options are calculated on the basis of p. By 
Theorem 3.1 and by the definition of bargaining functions we know that 
pi E[@‘,$~]. The other coordinates of p1 are identical to those in p and 
therefore we can conclude, by Theorem 3.1, that (Z7,p’) is a competitive 
equilibrium and p1 E P,. In a similar way we continue for pz,p3,. . till we 
obtain pk = B,(p) E P,. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 6.4. The operator B, is monotonic on P,. 
Proof. Let p, p’ E P, and assume p 5~‘. The prices of all houses are lower in 
p than in p’, and hence all buyers’ outside option prices based on p are lower 
than those based on p’. (All buyers are advantaged by the transition from p’ 
to p). Because of the monotonicity property of the bargaining functions [see 
(3.7)] we obtain B,(p) S B,(p’). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let Il be an E-partition for which P, is not empty. 
Such partitions always exist by Kaneko’s Theorem (Theorem 2.2). By 
Lemma 6.2, P, is a complete lattice. By Lemma 6.3 we know that 
B,(P,)c P,, and by Lemma 6.4 we know that B, is monotonic. By Tarski’s 
Theorem (Theorem 6.1) we can conclude that B, has a fixed point. By 
definition of the operator B,, for any p a fixed point of B,, (Zi’,p) is a 
bargaining equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let (n,p) be a bargaining equilibrium. By the 
definition of bargaining equilibria, (3.9), by Lemma 3.3 and by definition of 
the bargaining functions, (3.7), we know that for each pair T = {bi, sj} EL’ we 
have pi E [qf, gbi]. By Theorem 3.1 (n,p) is also a competitive 
equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let (n,p) be a competitive equilibrium of a replica 
economy 8’. It is easy to see that the resulting allocation has the equal 
treatment property. Let T= {bi,sj} be any pair in ii. Because of equal 
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treatment the price of all houses of type hj must be pj. Therefore $j zpj. 
Because in a competitive equilibrium we must have qJ s pj (see Theorem 3.1), 
we obtain 4 -sj =pj. In a similar way we obtain qbi =pj. The bargaining range 
of the pair T is reduced to a single point and FT(@j,jbi)=jj_ Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let B,: P,-+P, and let p have the stated property. 
Then, by Lemma 6.4, the sequence Bt+@), i E N, is a monotonic sequence. P, 
is a compact set, and therefore this sequence converges to a limit p*. The 
operator B, is continuous because it is a composition of continuous 
bargaining functions [see (3.8)], and because the outside options prices are 
continuous functions of p [see (2.2), (3.1)-(3.4)]. Therefore we have 
B,(p*) = B = lim B,(BB,fi(p)) = lim B;+‘+‘(p) =p*. 
i-00 
Thus p* is a fixed point of B,, and (ZI,p*) is a bargaining 
equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
It remains to exhibit price vectors with the monotonicity property used in 
the previous theorem. As we have seen, for a non-empty P, the range of the 
operator B, is again P,. Apart from the fact that there may be generically 
several IZ with P, # 0, (this does not happen with linear utility functions!), 
the structure of the set P, is quite complicated - these sets may be not 
connected. Each connected component of a set P, is by itself a complete 
lattice (with the same operations as before). The operator B, preserves 
connected sets in B,. This can be seen with the help of Theorem 3.1, where 
any point in an entire connected interval can be substituted while preserving 
the stability implied by the competitive equilibrium. We can conclude that in 
every connected component there are minimal and maximal elements 
(relative to the order defined on P,) and, their image under B, being in the 
same component, they must exhibit the property required by Theorem 4.4, 
with g= 1. 
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